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Decision Theory and Antitrust:
Quantitative Evaluation for Efficient Enforcement
IRA HOROWITZ*
Developments in computer technology and advances in applied
mathematics and statistics have helped make an increasing number and varie-
ty of managerial decision problems susceptible to solution by mathematical
and decision-theoretic procedures. Assuredly, management is occasionally
confronted by truly unique decisions that are perceived as being too impor-
tant to delegate to the cold calculus of scientific decisionmaking, but where
repetitive decisions are involved the applicability of the quantitative approach
associated with management science is unquestioned.' The analyst's respon-
sibility in the latter event is helping management to correctly define the pro-
blem and to quantify those subjective managerial inputs, such as probability
judgments and risk preferences, that are to be incorporated into the decision-
making process.
An extra dividend of the quantitative approach to decisionmaking is that
it indicates how people "should behave in complicated situations, provided
*Professor and Chairman, Department of Management, University of Florida. The first
draft of this paper was written during the author's fifteen-month stint as Senior Economist in the
Economic Policy Office of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice. The present version
has benefitted from, but should not be blamed on, the comments of my former EPO colleagues
Ted Gebhard, George Hay, Jon Joyce and Robert McGuckin, as well as those of Professor Joseph
Brodley of Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington. An earlier draft was presented before
the Society of Government Economists in Atlantic City, NJ, on September 16, 1976.
'See, e.g., Weinwurm, Limitations of the Scientific Method in Management Science, S
MANAGEMENT Sci. 225 (1957), where the author observes that "when top level management deci-
sions are at stake . . .a much larger and often a decisive portion of the required data are non-
quantitative and there is much uncertainty as to expected developments. Under those conditions,
decision making will involve substantial individual judgment. The chances are much smaller that
mathematical models and quantitative data will be sufficient or suitable to provide a basis for
optimum decision making." Id. at 229. There has, however, been some very important work
undertaken to refine the art of quantifying ostensibly judgmental, non-quantifiable issues, which
has as one of its major virtues the fact that it specifically permits the use of scientific decision-
making in unique decisionmaking contexts. See, e.g., Savage, Elicitation of Personal Probabilities
and Expectations, 66J. AM.STATISTICAL A. 783 (1971); Winkler, The Assessment of Prior Distribu-
tions in Bayesian Analysis, 62 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 776 (1967); Winkler, The Quantification of
Judgment: Some Methodological Suggestions, 62 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 1105 (1967).
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[they] can make choices in a coherent manner in relatively simple, un-
complicated situations." 2 It both clarifies the informational inputs that should
enter into the decisionmaking process and calls attention to any instances in
which decisionmakers are reaching decisions that are- at variance with their
"true" preferences. Decisionmaking in the antitrust context is especially
amenable to quantification and can particularly benefit from these important
bonuses of the quantitative approach. The latter observation provides the
raison d'etre for this article.
In particular, the purposes of this article are three-fold. First, I shall at-
tempt to formally set out the decision-theoretic framework within which the
information processing problem in an antitrust context is resolved. Second, I
shall more directly infer from this framework both the informational
demands of effective antitrust policy and how this information should be pro-
cessed. 3 Finally, I shall suggest the changing nature of the economist's role in
the effective implementation of antitrust policy both in determining which
situations should be investigated in detail and in determining which alleged
anticompetitive acts should be prosecuted. In so doing I shall neglect the
potentially important but complex "portfolio" aspects of the problem, i.e.
given the time and resource constraints, what is the optimal set of suits that
should be brought by the authorities at any point in time?
SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
One of the purposes of this article is to reflect on the economist's role in
the antitrust process. It therefore seems appropriate to specify at the outset
the two principal philosophical biases that underlie these reflections.
The first bias stems from a basic belief that the field of industrial
organization affords economists an opportunity to blend microeconomic
theory and classical empirical techniques in unique and sophisticated ways.
Until recently, however, this opportunity has not been exploited by
economists directly involved with antitrust enforcement. Rather, economic
practitioners have permitted, if not encouraged, an intimate knowledge of the
antitrust laws and a general understanding of legal precedent to become of
greater import in the analysis of realized and prospective antitrust cases than
either microeconomic or basic statistical theories. 4 Indeed, the traditional role
2Raiffa, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms: Comment, 75 Q.J. EcON. 690 (1961)
(emphasis in original).
'This article restricts attention to the information-processing problem from the standpoint
of the antitrust decisionmaking authority. A forthcoming paper treats the problem from the
court's point of view. See Horowitz, A Bayesian View of Post-Acquisition Evidence and Antitrust
(Mimeo 1977).4This permission is not necessarily extended to analyses for the purposes of making internal
recommendations. As David D. Martin has written: "The policy of competition did not originate
with the economics profession. It is deeply rooted in the law and other institutions of American
society and, fortunately, it does not depend upon universal or even widespread acceptance by
professional economists. Indeed, the continued acceptance by society of professional economists
as relevant and useful advisers to a democratic government and as teachers of the young is more
likely to depend in the years ahead upon the profession's acceptance of democratic, decentralized
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of economists in antitrust enforcement has been to provide lawyers and courts
with only such economic information as has been accepted in the law as be-
ing relevant to antitrust. This implies that economic information must be in a
form that is intelligible to attorneys, irrespective of the availability of less
easily understood, but more sophisticated and meaningful techniques and for-
mats.5
The position of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws, that "[l]egal requirements are prescribed by legislatures and
courts, not by economic science,"' 6 pretty much puts in perspective, proper
and otherwise, the place to which economists and economic science have been
relegated where antitrust enforcement is concerned. Notably, the prosecution
of perceived anticompetitive acts has traditionally required the background
services of an economist to perform certain clerical tasks, such as the com-
putation of concentration ratios, the collection and collation of economic in-
formation, or the graphical presentation of a time series of economic data.
The rules of evidence are generally invoked to command the presence of the
economist in the courtroom to introduce or to defend the fruits of these
labors. To the extent that an economist serves as either an expert witness, or
is on hand to suggest questions to be asked of expert witnesses, it is subject to
the constraints implied by the legal procedures of antitrust enforcement.7
Restricting the economist's input in this fashion is not entirely
unreasonable in view of the emphasis given to market structure by both an-
titrust lawyers and industrial organization economists. The traditional con-
cerns of industrial organization are market structure and its determinants, the
economic performance associated with various market structures, and the
principal methods of business conduct employed to effect this performance
structures of control of economic activity as a sine qua non of economic analysis of public policy
issues." Martin, Industrial Organization and Reorganization, 10 J. EcoN. ISSUES 81, 94-95 (1976).
Martin's comments on statistical analysis are also representative of this point of view: "My own
conclusion is that demonstration of the relationship [between concentration and profits] is rele-
vant, but not by any means necessary or sufficient, to justify government intervention to ac-
complish a more decentralized structure of control, and that it has been persuasively
demonstrated within the limits of the data and the statistical method." Id. at 92.5Assuredly, economists might be called upon as expert witnesses and, based upon whatever
sophisticated analytical tools and methodologies they might employ, testify as to certain relevant
economic issues and conclusions. Alternatively, an economist might employ sophisticated analysis
in the preparation of questions to be asked of, e.g., an expert witness during cross-examination.
But, if the judge or jury trying the case are unable to understand the logic that underlies the
testimony, it is doubtful whether this expert testimony or cross-examination is going to have
much of an impact on the decision, notwithstanding the expert's credentials. As the editors of the
Antitrust Law and Economics Review have written: "One can deplore the fact that the possessors
of advanced scientific knowledge do not, in the main, hold the policymaking positions in our
society but one cannot change it one iota, at least in the short run. Antitrust policy in America is
controlled entirely by lawyers, and they read only words not math symbols." Foreward, 8 AN.
TrrRusT L. & EcON. Rzv. 7 (No. 2, 1976). Indeed, the last sentence in note 4, supra, attests to
the fact that even for a person who understands the logic, one concentration ratio can be worth a
thousand regressions.
'U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITrEE TO
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS - 1955, at 316 (1955).
'See note 5 supra.
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under various structural conditions. Strictly from an antitrust standpoint,
however, methods of business conduct have tended to remain ancillary issues,
except insofar as they represented clear and unequivocal restraints of trade.9
In the latter event, the government's problem is to produce the "smoking
gun" or its equivalent. Measures of economic performance have been of in-
terest insofar as they could be used to infer the structural conditions
generating the performance. Thus, the literary debates between the struc-
turalists and the behaviorists notwithstanding, 0 as a practical matter antitrust
enforcement has in the main retained its structural orientation." On the one
hand, this structural orientation is unassailable when the sole policy concern
is the preservation of a competitive economy and polypolistic industries,
which by any standards implies the inability of any single economic agent to
influence price. On the other hand, the correspondence between industry
structure and market power, with all of the latter's tenebrous forebodings, is
not isomorphic. This suggests that implementation of an antitrust policy
aimed at preserving industrial structures in which prices are to all essential
purposes freely determined by market forces demands that primary considera-
tion be given as to how prices are, in fact, determined. The focus should be
on an industry's economic performance, and the key concern should be with
whether the behavior that effected this performance was the logical
outgrowth of structural conditions within the industry.
The second bias that underlies these reflections is the view that antitrust
is a policy instrument. There are two aspects to this view. First, because an-
titrust laws are a part of an economy's institutional framework, changes in
the laws fit into the array of instruments at the policy makers' disposal.' 2
'The tradition was apparently started by Edward S. Mason. See Mason, Price and Produc-
tion Policies of Large-Scale Enterprise, 29 AM. EcON. REV. 61 (Supp. 1939).
9In Maple Floor Mfrs' Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925), the Court stated "that
trade associations . . . which openly and fairly gather and disseminate information . . . without
however reaching or attempting to reach any agreement or any concerted action with respect to
prices or production or restraining competition, do not thereby engage in unlawful restraint of
commerce." Id. at 586. The Court thus distinguished acceptable (noncollusive) trade practices
from those that are blatantly anticompetitive in nature. See, e.g., United States v. Container
Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Sugar In-
stitute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); United States Maltsters Ass'n v. FTC, 152
F.2d 161 (1945); Salt Producers Ass'n v. FTC, 134 F.2d 354 (1943). See also United Shoe
Machinery Corp. v. United States, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam), affd 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953); United States v. New York Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). These latter cases all
reflect a judicial concern with the implications of business practices for market structure, rather
than concern with whether the practices are in and of themselves anticompetitive.
"
5 For a concise summary of the issues, see F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMuIC PERFORMANCE 6-7 (1970).
"See, e.g., Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts-From
Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REV. 285 (1967). As Brodley noted: "[I]n deter-
mining whether a challenged activity unreasonably restrains trade . . . or threatens to injure
competition . . . a prime decisional factor should become the relationship between the chal-
lenged conduct and oligopoly market structure." Id. at 339.
"
tAn analogous situation would be the policymakers' changes in the tax system or in the ex-
tent of public ownership of enterprises.
[Vol. 52:713
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Principle and practice diverge, however, insofar as the laws themselves might
be quite simple, whereas the courts' interpretation of what constitutes a viola-
tion of those laws may be very complex and not readily amenable to
legislative revision for economic policy purposes.
Second, the decision whether or not to invoke, or to consider invoking the
antitrust laws in a particular instance is also a policy decision. In the latter
context, when consideration is given to the use of an antitrust statute in a
particular situation, this potential use becomes an instrument of direct con-
trol. 13 Assuredly, in a world of cost-free legal administration, and where the
determination of an anticompetitive act is a quickly and easily resolved issue,
the decision to investigate and bring suit against an alleged anticompetitive
act would be a foregone conclusion: all such allegations would be prosecuted.
In our world, however, antitrust enforcement is neither cost nor error free.
The time factor is of enormous importance, and these issues combine to make
it inefficient or impractical to attempt to investigate or prosecute all allega-
tions of anticompetitive behavior. Thus, the decision whether or not to in-
vestigate a situation, as well as the decision to sue, becomes a matter of
policy. The decision to sue has in the past been resolved by the decision rule
that all "good" cases, those whose gross benefits are not negative, are filed.
The justifications for this rule are: (1) there are too few, rather than too
many candidates; (2) there is an important deterrent factor to the active pro-
secution of the antitrust laws; and (3) once the legal process begins to unfold
and a violation of the law is perceived, there are moral and ethical hazards in
not following through. The counterarguments to this rule are: (1) the first
justification suggests that budget and staff reallocations might be warranted;
(2) it is not unlikely that undiscovered pricefixing is the most prevalent anti-
competitive act, despite the fact that pricefixing cases are constantly being fil-
ed, and the availability to defendants of stalling tactics may make it possible
for them to reap all the profits of anticompetitive behavior before a final
judgment is reached that halts that behavior; and (3) greater effort should be
expended at the preliminary investigation stage, as well as the preceding stage
wherein judgments are made as to situations that will in fact be investigated
in some detail to assure that the "important" rather than simply the "good"
cases are filed. The thrust of these counterarguments is that the crucial ques-
tion involves where and how in the administrative hierarchy these policy deci-
sions should be made.14
The position taken here is that irrespective of whether legal or economic
issues are pertinent at trial, it is the economic policy considerations that are
pertinent to the policy decision that determines whether there will be a trial.
As policy instruments, the antitrust laws have as their main objective main-
SFor a detailed discussion of policy instruments, see N. SPULBER & I. HOROWITZ, QUAN-
TITATIVE EcONOMIC POLICY AND PLANNING 112-19 (1976).
"4The issue is not unique to antitrust. Where a traffic violation is concerned, for example,
a state trooper might make the decision; where an allegation of discriminatory hiring practices is
concerned, a university's affirmative action officer might make the decision. In these cases even




taining polypolistic industrial structures in the United States. Economic
theory tells us that such structures result in lower prices and higher outputs
than those obtained in comparable oligopolistic and monopolistic industries.
When exploited, the power to raise price and restrict output, resulting in ex-
cess profits that benefit corporate stockholders, also impacts upon many of
the desiderata of economic policy that are the perennial concerns of
policymakers. In particular, anticompetitive practices not only help maintain
and promote income inequities, they also contribute to unemployment and
adversely affect the rates of inflation and real economic growth, working con-
ditions, the balance of payments, and other problem areas.' 5 Thus, policy
decisions with respect to the implementation of the antitrust laws should take
into consideration the impact of this measure on all of the objectives of
economic policy. Such consideration places the issue clearly within the do-
main of the economist rather than that of the lawyer. As is conceded with
respect to restraints of trade,' 6 all monopolies are not created equal. In the
real world, as in a theoretical world with a finite number of competitors,
every firm has some power to raise price. In a polypolistic industry this power
is miniscule. There comes a point, however, where the power to raise price
becomes "unreasonable," precisely because of its macroeconomic, as well as
its microeconomic implications.17 If, in fact, the preservation of a competitive
economy is a national goal, it is a national goal because it enables us to bet-
ter achieve our national desiderata than would an economy of monopolies,
and not simply because competition, in and of itself and irrespective of its
economic consequences, is a desideratum. The present position thus argues
for a broader perspective of "the monopoly problem" under which the overall
economic implications of antitrust decisions will play at least as great a role
as the legal aspects." s
The bottom line on all of this is to recognize that market structure and
its various indicia 9 only signal the potential for anticompetitive behavior:
notably, the power to raise price, which can have ubiquitous economic im-
"The "other problems areas" include the potential social and political problems created by
large firms in oligopolistic industries, as exemplified by the recent revelations of corporate
bribery.
"See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
"The producers' power to increase the price of bubble gum, e.g., is unlikely to have dire
implications for firms outside of the bubble gum industry or for nonpurchasers of the product. In
contrast, the power of the steel manufacturers to increase price is fraught with danger for the
economy as a whole. An increase in the price of steel could have a serious inflationary impact,
could lead to severe unemployment (e.g., in the automobile industry), could slow down the na-
tion's rate of economic growth, and could have deleterious effects on the balance of payments as
steel-using imports are substituted for domestically produced products.
"Moreover, from this broader perspective the current set of antitrust statutes may well suf-
fice to accomplish any restructuring of American industry designed to promote economic welfare.
That is, if society's goals are being adversely affected by an industry's structure, then these
adverse affects should be due to anticompetitive behavior that can be remedied in the courts. To
achieve the desired end, the judicial process would seem to have at least as much to recommend
it as does the legislative process.
"The various indicia of market structure include concentration ratios, number of sellers
and buyers, the absolute size of firms, barriers-to-entry proxies, extent of product diversification
and degree of vertical integration.
[Vol. 52:713
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plications. Similarly, the various forms of what is apparently anticompetitive
business conduct, i.e. price leadership, reciprocity, and tying agreements, are
only symptomatic of structural conditions that both facilitate anticompetitive
behavior, and adversely affect microeconomic and macroeconomic perfor-
mance. Economic performance as indicated by price, product quality,
technological progress and efficiency is a matter of ultimate microeconomic
interest. The key issues, however, are the extent to which actual performance
approximates the industry potential, and the extent to which the desiderata
of economic policy are adversely affected, as well as recognition of the fact
that the industry's potential is not necessarily the norm that obtains in a
perfectly competitive world of microeconomic theory.
These neither novel nor indisputable views argue for an increasing
reliance upon more sophisticated economic analysis in the antitrust enforce-
ment process than has heretofore been the case. At least in this respect, they
are not incompatible with courtroom trends.20 As a concomitant, the infor-
mational demands that are made upon industrial organization economists will
increase. In particular, at the theoretical level there remains the need to
specify the determinants of market structure, and the linkages between struc-
ture, conduct, and performance, including macroeconomics impacts, in an
uncertain world in which economic rationality is not necessarily a universal
affliction. Within the present broader perspective there is the need to refine
the relationship between various empirical data, including economic indicia,
and the economist's theoretical constructs, in order to determine how these
data might best be used in antitrust analysis. It is also necessary to determine
optimal industry structures and performance potentials, given the empirical
facts of life. At the empirical level, it will be necessary (1) to continue to
generate firm and industry data relating to structure, conduct, and perfor-
mance; (2) to provide estimates of the "payoffs" to society of investigating,
prosecuting, and, possibly, convicting firm(s) of allegedly anticompetitive
acts; (3) to assess the various probabilities that previous anticompetitive
behavior has led to less than optimal economic performance or that an ac-
quisition will have an anticompetitive impact; and (4) to perform the latter
assessments both a priori, based on an initial stock of theoretical and em-
pirical knowledge, and a posteriori, after having systematically revised the
former, initial judgments, based upon additional information gathered in the
course of subsequent investigation. This conglomeration of economic informa-
tion, which is at most tangential to the strictly legal aspects of antitrust, is,' or
at any rate should be crucial to the antitrust decisionmaking process at some
if not all of its several stages. The cost of information, the direct costs incur-
red by both prosecution and defense in the course of an antitrust suit and the
"
0See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), affg 341 F.
Supp. 534 (N.D. Ill. 1972). In affirming the district court's "fully justified" reliance "on evidence
relating to changes in the patterns and structure of the coal industry and in United Electric's coal
reserve situation after the time of acquisition," 415 U.S. at 506, the Court gave precedent-
establishing evidence of a willingness to accept broader and more sophisticated economic analysis
and economic considerations, notwithstanding the possibility of "a positive decision on the part of
the merged companies to deliberately but temporarily refrain from anti-competitive actions." Id.
1977]
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potential costs to society of an incorrect decision, all argue in favor of im-
proving the decisionmaking process. As I hope to make evident, there is both
room for improvement and reason to be optimistic about the possibility of
achieving improvement.
THE ANTITRUST PROBLEM
Antitrust policy is implemented primarily through the enforcement of sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 21 section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 22 and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 23 Both the Sher-
man Act and Federal Trade Commission Act are concerned with alleviating
observed anticompetitive behavior; the Clayton Act is concerned with preven-
ting a potential lessening of competition. 24 Thus, while both the Sherman Act
and the Federal Trade Commission Act are concerned with the past and pre-
sent, the Clayton Act is concerned with the future. Despite this dichotomy,
the fundamental questions that must be considered in implementing antitrust
policy under these acts are only superficially different. In any instance one
must ask: What are the costs and benefits to society of both the allegedly an-
ticompetitive act and the prospective remedy and what are the probabilities
that an anticompetitive act has in fact been committed and that the courts
can be convinced that the antitrust laws have been violated?
With respect to benefits and costs, the Supreme Court's position is clear:
[A] merger the effect of which 'may be substantially to lessen competition' is
not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits
and credits, it may be deemed beneficial. A value choice of such magnitude
is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial competence, and in any event has
been made for us already, by Congress [when it] proscribed anticompetitive
mergers, the benign and the malignant alike, fully aware, we must assume,
that some price might have to be paid.2s
2115 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (Supp. V 1975).
2215 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
2115 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. V 1975).
4Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal those contracts, combinations, or con-
spiracies "in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations."
15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975). Section 2 of the Sherman Act deems persons guilty of a felony,
who either individually or in combination "shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. § 2
(Supp. V 1975). Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act declares unlawful: "Unfair
methods of competition . . . and unfair or deceptive acts or Practices in or affecting commerce."
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975). The crucial section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits the ac-
quisition of the capital stock or assets of one corporation by another "where in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
The only other serious candidate for inclusion in an itemized list would be section 2 of the
amended Clayton Act, i.e., the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1970), which makes it unlawful "to discriminate in price between different purchasers of com-
modities of like commodities of like grade and quality," unless such price differences reflect "due
allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery .. "
"United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963).
[Vol. 52:713
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It is equally clear, however, that in deciding which cases to prosecute, or
which situations to investigate in depth when time pressures and limited
resources constrain antitrust enforcement activity, the antitrust authorities are
constantly making these benefit-cost evaluations, and properly so, even
though they are doing so without even mildly approaching quantitative preci-
sion and without due cognizance for all of the relevant economic issues. 26
With respect to probabilities, these evaluations are inherent within our
judicial system in general. With specific regard to antitrust, they are incor-
porated in two different, if related, ways.
In the first instance, the antitrust authorities, are necessarily concerned
about the probability of "proving" an allegation. Similarly, a judge or jury is
concerned about the probability that an allegation has indeed been "proved."
Specific probability assessments may not be made, but there is a necessary
underlying concern with whether the probabilities that a firm's behavior 'has
been both anticompetitive and a demonstrable violation of the antitrust laws
are sufficiently high as to justify, in the case of the prosecutor, bringing suit,
and in the case of the court, rendering a verdict of guilty. The defense staff
must make analogous probability judgments in deciding, for example,
whether to seek an out of court settlement, or whether to enter a plea of nolo
contendere. Moreover, although the probabilities in question may differ bet-
ween whether a particular allegation can be sustained and also shown to be
an unreasonable restraint of trade in either the per se or "rule of reason"
sense,27 or is refutable by the defense insofar as prima facie issues are in-
volved, 26 the probabilities will be recognized and assessed, however vaguely.
26When the Justice Department dropped its antitrust suits against tire manufacturers
Goodyear and Firestone in March 1976, the Antitrust Division Head Thomas E. Kauper stated
that "[i]t was clear that neither of the individual defendants had a reasonable probability of ob-
taining a monopoly .. " Wall St. J., March 3, 1976, at p. 3, col. 1. It is estimated that the
Justice Department invested more than $1 million in the pretrial investigation, but nonetheless
the suits were dropped "with the greatest reluctance," according to Mr. Kauper, because "at this
point, I believe it irresponsible to proceed further." Id. When the FTC began its "broad antitrust
investigation of the auto industry that could have major long-range consequences for the "Big
Three car makers," it was estimated by FTC officials "that the investigation would span two to
three years with only a 50% chance of producing sufficient evidence to support formal antitrust
charges." Wall St. J., Aug. 4, 1976, at p. 3, col. 1.
In each of these instances both probabilities and the considerable costs of time and money
were important considerations, whether the decision was to drop the suit, as in the first instance,
or to conduct a pretrial investigation, as in the second. Each situation is quite clearly of major
potential import. Yet, as will become clear below, neither decision, apparently, gave due con-
sideration to all of the relevant probabilities, costs, and potential benefits. If this is the case with
respect to million-dollar investigations of the crucial auto and tire industries, it is unlikely to be
otherwise-at best-in situations whose potential implications for the antitrust authorities and the
economy are not quite as profound.27Per se prohibitions relate to practices whose illegality does not hinge on their social im-
plications. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). "Rule of
reason" violations are those which hinge on whether unusual business practices that have anti-
social implications are involved. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 221
U.S. 1 (1911).
"Although strictly speaking there are no well-established Prima facie issues in an antitrust
case, with respect to specific issues in specific cases, evidence can be "taken in the context of a
prima facie case." United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 560 (1966). Similariy,
although there are no formal, unbending prima fade rules to guide the decision of whether to
1977]
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In the second instance, a probability is itself directly involved in the
allegation. In particular, over seventy years ago the Supreme Court noted
that the Sherman Act "directs itself against that dangerous probability as well
as against the completed result . . . the law seeks to prevent-for instance,
the monopoly .... 29 And, nearly twenty years ago the Court observed that
"Section 7 is designed to arrest in its incipiency . . . restraints or monopolies
in a relevant market which, as a reasonable probability, appear at the time of
suit likely to result from the acquisition . . . [W]hether or not actual
restraints or monopolies, or the substantial lessening of competition, have oc-
curred or are intended."3 0 Both the courts and the antitrust authorities must
therefore assess these probabilities, even if the lower bounds of dangerousness
and reasonableness are never specified.3 1
In sum, then, from its incipiency to its conclusion, an anti-trust case re-
quires a series of both subjective probability assessments and benefit-cost
value judgments, although these are rarely made explicit and quantified. The
latter observation implies that an antitrust case is quite aptly described as a
compound decision problem under uncertainty. Further, framing it as such
greatly clarifies both (1) the responsibilities of the antitrust authorities, in-
cluding both the legal and economic staffs, and the courts, in the implemen-
tation of antitrust policy, and (2) the informational needs of effective an-
titrust enforcement. The remainder of this article is devoted to these framing
and clarification ends.
THE ANTITRUST PROBLEM IN A DECISION-THEORETIC CONTEXT
Antitrust enforcement decisions can be characterized as two-action pro-
blems in which the decisionmaking authority can either choose (1) to do
nothing, or (2) to proceed as if an anticompetitive act as occurred and a con-
viction can be obtained. Indeed, it is tempting to restrict an analysis of the
antitrust decision process to the classic two-action framework of statistical
decision theory. It can be inferred that the authorities have had considerable
difficulty in resisting the temptation.
Formally framing the two-action problem, the choice of whether or not to
initiate an antitrust action will depend upon the decisionmaker's initial pro-
bability judgments as to whether some anticompetitive act has occurred, the
extent to which the odds favoring the allegation of anticompetitive behavior
are revised upwards on the basis of the empirical evidence, and the potential
file suit, the Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines suggest instances when "the Department
will ordinarily challenge any merger between one of the most likely entrants into the market" and
firms already in the market. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES 22 (May 30, 1968).
"Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905) (emphasis added).
"
0United States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 386, 389 (1957) (emphasis
added).
"Iln fact, there is no need to make these probabilities specific. Rather, one might simply
assign probabilities to there being a dangerous or a reasonable probability of monopoly. At a
more sophisticated level, one might assess a probability function for the probability of a monopo-
ly, i.e. one might assess a probability of Pi that there is a probability of QO that a particular
practice or merger will result in a monopoly.
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losses associated with taking the incorrect course of action. Each of these fac-
tors is amenable to explicit quantification. With the factors so quantified
there is a greater likelihood that the "take action" act will be the optimal
choice when the following is found: (1) the decisionmaker's initial feelings are
strong that an anticompetitive act has occurred; (2) there is subsequent evi-
dence to indicate a greater probability that an anticompetitive act has taken
place; and' (3) the loss associated with an incorrect decision to act as if there
has been no anticompetitive behavior is greater than the loss associated with
choosing to do nothing when in fact an anticompetitive act has taken place. 32
Whether the chosen act actually is or is not optimal, however, will also de-
pend upon other factors that lurk in the background. Yet, the suspicion per-
sists that in the actual decisionmaking process the antitrust authorities tend to
be myopic and vague with respect to one or more of the factors33 , and fail to
give appropriate weight and recognition to all.
Even if explicitly quantified, however, both the probabilities and the
losses would obscure a complex of underlying factors. This is because the im-
plementation of antitrust policy involves, in any given instance, a sequence of
decisions. The sequence starts with the decision of whether to investigate a
particular situation, proceeds to the subsequent decision of whether to bting
suit, and concludes with the court's judgment. The elements in the decision
process are set out in the decision tree of FIGURE I. Additional branches
could be included at the end points to allow for the possibility of one or more
appeals by either the defense or the prosecution, but these branches only con-
tain modified versions of decision sequences that are already included. Thus,
their inclusion would contribute to complexity but not substance. Conversely,
many of the branches could at the outset be cut off, because they represent
paths that would never be taken, such as the decision to file suit in the face
of convincing procompetitive evidence, or include probabilities that will
always be zero.
This particular decision tree, which except for the specifics has the plea-
sant property of being devoid of unique features, is constructed from the
standpoint of the antitrust authority. The squares indicate points at which a
"In technical terms, let V denote the outcome that an anticompetitive act obtains, and let
V denote the outcome that an anticompetitive act does not obtain. Also, denote by P(V) the pro-
bability assigned to V, and denote by P(V)= I-P(V) the probability assigned to V. Then, P(VID)
and P(DIV) are, respectively, the conditional probability assigned to outcome V, given some set
of data D, and the probability assigned to acquiring that set of data D, given that outcome V
obtains; P(VID) and P(DIV) are. similarly defined. Finally, denote by L(V) the loss associated
with the act of doing nothing, A, when in fact there is an anticompetitive act, and denote by
L(V) the loss associated with taking aciton, A2 , when in fact there is no anticompetitive behavior.
Then, act A, can be shown to be optimal when
P(D iV) > P(V'IL(Vi
P(DIV) P(V)L(V)
or, equivalently, when
P(V >D ~ L(V)
P(VID) L(V)
Act A2 is optimal when the inequality is reversed. The two acts are equally preferred when the
strict equality holds.





decision must be taken. The first decision, indicated by the square at the far
left of the tree, requires a choice between investigating (I) or not investigating
(1) a particular situation or allegation. The only other decision, as indicated
by the remaining squares, requires a choice between bringing suit (S) or not
bringing suit (-) given what, for expository purposes, are limited to the
favorable (+), neutral (0), or unfavorable (-) results of the investigation or,
alternatively, one might delay and seek yet additional information. This in-
formation determines the path to be followed along the decision tree. In ac-
tual practice, however, there are a series of steps at each stage. To the extent
that these steps can be defined in advance they can be incorporated into a
more complex decision tree with a multitude of decision points.
The circles indicate a judicial decision subsequent to a decision to bring
suit. From the standpoint of the antitrust decisionmaking authority, however,
the court's decision adds an additional element of uncertainty, albeit one that
is amenable to quantification in terms of probabilities or odds. These pro-
babilities, which can be purely subjective, may be assigned even prior to the
initial decision of whether or not to conduct a preliminary investigation, and
can also be systematically revised prior to the investigation. The revision will
be contingent on the character of any additional information that might be
uncovered during the preliminary investigation. Thus, the probability
assigned to whether a verdict of guilty (G) or not guilty (U) will ultimately be
rendered will depend on both the prosecuting staff's initial impressions, as
conditioned by prior knowledge and experience, and on the evidence un-
covered in the course of the pretrial investigation. 34 In the Bayesian spirit, the
only restrictions imposed on these probabilities are that they must obey the
various laws of probability, 35 and they must reflect the decisionmaker's beliefs
as regards the relative likelihood of one outcome as opposed to another.
Whether these probabilities are "right" or "wrong" is not an issue; the only
relevant question is whether these are the beliefs upon which the decision-
maker's decisions will be based, irrespective of whether these decisions are
given the full, formal treatment.
The dots indicate points at which, again, the outcomes of individual
events are uncertain. In particular, prior to the initiation of the entire deci-
34As a result of a preliminary investigation and/or the decision to file suit, the company
that is the subject of the allegation might seek an out-of-court settlement or enter a plea of nolo
contendere. As a result of an indication to proceed with litigation, the parties to a merger might
decide not to carry through with their plans. To simplify the presentation, these possibilities are
not included in the decision tree, but they are, in effect, the equivalents of a guilty verdict.
Similarly, the government's option to drop a suit, or to oppose a settlement or plea, is always
available, although not considered in this decision tree.
Also for expository purposes, the probabilistic processes involved are considered to be
discrete rather than continuous. Finally, to the extent that new information becomes available at
the time of trial, at that time the probabilities will be revised to take this information into con-
sideration. If the possibility of this information turning up has been recognized, then this con-
tingency will be allowed for in the decision process. If this possibility has not been recognized,
then the information will not affect the decision process, although it will still affect subsequent
probability judgments.35For example, the probabilities must be nonnegative.
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sion process, it is not known what evidence will be gleaned through the pre-
trial investigation. The outcomes of this investigation will be evidence
favorable, neutral, or unfavorable to the allegation of anticompetitive
behavior. Thus, these sample outcomes must also be assigned probabilities.
The latter probability assignments will directly depend upon the probabilities
associated with yet another uncertain situation: whether in fact an an-
ticompetitive act has (V) or has not (V) been committed.
In each case the probability of the outcome of the uncertain event can be
assigned either a priori or a posteriori. An a posteriori probability is condi-
tional on the outcomes of prior uncertain events. The latter outcomes include
any sample information, e.g. evidence, that has been generated up to that
point.3
6
36P(V) is the prior probability that an anticompetitive act has been committed, as assessed,
e.g., solely on the basis of an analyst's institutional and general knowledge, and P(V/+ ) is the
analyst's revised probability assessment of anticompetitive behavior. Here, P(V) has been
systematically revised to yield P(VI+ ) on the basis of sample information favoring the hypothesis
that an anticompetitive act has in fact occurred. The revision will ordinarily be accomplished us-
ing Bayes' rule:
P(V)P(+ IV)
P(Vl)Pk+ 1 V) + P(V)P(+T
Here, the denominator P(V)P(+ IV) + P(V)P(+ IV) = P(+ ) is the prior probability that an in-
vestigation will yield information favorable to the allegation.
The terms "prior" and "posterior" are both terms relative to the specific sample informa-
tion. Given an additional sample, P(VI+ ) now becomes a prior probability to be revised on the
basis of that new sample information. In the course of an antitrust investigation, probability
judgments are constantly being revised, although I suspect that the first instance where this has
been done formally via Bayes' rule has yet to be uncovered. The present discussion reserves the
term "prior" for probability assessments made prior to a pretrial investigation and the term
"posterior" for probability assessments made subsequent to that investigation. Thus, probabilities
formulated through, e.g., the Antitrust Division's formal Business Review procedure become
prior probabilities with respect to any subsequent pretrial investigation. For discussions of the
Bayesian Approach and the law see Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification
Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489, 498-514 (1970) (positive position); Kaplan, Decision Theory
and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1083-86 (1968) (positive position); Korms-
tein, A Bayesian Model of Harmless Error, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (1976); Tribe, Trial by
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1350-68 (1971)
(negative position).
As a general rule, the conditional probabilities P(Vl.) and P(VlI) will be assigned in accor-
dance with Bayes' rule. The conditional probabilities P(GlI) and P(..l*.)may be assigned using
Bayes' rule, and based upon prior probability assignments P(G) and P(G), but I perceive these
conditional probabilities as being easier to assign directly. In fact, decisionmakers are always
well-advised to assess directly those probabilities that they feel most comfortable about assessing
directly. But, one would ordinarily be ill-advised to assess directly both P(V) and, say P(VI e),
because (1) the subjective assessment of posterior probabilities generally results in probability
assignments different from those obtained using Bayes' rule and the prior assessments and (2) for
most persons the direct assessment of posterior probabilities will, given their prior judgments,
result in an underutilization of the sample information. An important related issue is the fact
that the probabilities will ordinarily be assigned by groups of people, legal and economic staffs,
and thus reflect their combined judgments. The assignment of probabilities for a group of in-
dividuals whose judgments will not necessarily coincide presents its own unique problems. See,
e.g., Edwards, Conservatism in Human Information Processing, in FORMAL REPRESENTATION OF
HUMAN JUDGMENT 17 (B. Kleinmuntz ed. 1968). See also Hogarth, Cognitive Processes and the
Assessment of Subjective Probability Distributions, 70 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 271 (1975);
Winkler, Comment, 70 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 290 (1975); Edwards, Comment, 70 J. AM.
STATISTICAL A. 291 (1975); Hogarth, Rejoinder, 70 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 294 (1975).
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The end point of each branch of the decision tree shows a payoff
associated with that particular sequence of decisions and outcomes. The
payoffs, denoted by the letter w, reflect the antitrust authority's willingness to
accept risk, as well as the economic consequences of the particular sequence
of outcomes and decisions. Thus w(V) is the "payoff" to the antitrust authori-
ty, i.e. the policymaking body that is entrusted with reflecting societal
preferences, in the event that no action at all is taken when in fact an anti-
competitive act has occurred. Similarly, w (V,I,S,G) is the "payoff" in the
event that there is no anticompetitive behavior (V), but that, nonetheless, an
investigation is undertaken (I), a suit is brought (S), and the defendant cor-
poration is found guilty of an antitrust violation (G). In principle, such costs
as the costs of conducting a pretrial investigation, the costs of bringing suit,
including the costs of going to trial, and the social costs of failing to attack
and correct anticompetitive behavior will enter into the payoff function; and
again in principle, and appropriate payoff function can be specified.
In sum, at the pre-investigation stage the uncertainties involve whether
anticompetitive behavior obtains and the direction in which the evidence that
has not yet been gathered will point. At the pretrial stage, the uncertainties
involve whether anticompetitive behavior obtains and the direction in which
the evidence that has not as yet been gathered will point. At the trial stage,
the uncertainties involve whether anticompetitive behavior obtains and the
court's decision. At the retrospective stage, the uncertainty once again, is with
respect to whether in fact, as evaluated by some omniscient jurist, there has
indeed been anticompetitive behavior.37 To determine the antitrust
authority's optimal decision at each of the two decision points requires an
assessment, both a priori and a posteriori, of the probabilties, associated with
each of these uncertain events, as well as the terminal stage "payoffs," for
every given sequence of decisions and outcomes, assigned to that sequence by
the decisionmaking authority.
Assuredly, many of these same elements enter into the current decision-
making process, although in a less formal, non-quantitative fashion. In par-
ticular, with respect to the payoffs, the traditional approach contents itself
with what are at best vague and general statements of the monetary costs of
taking positive actions up to the next decision point, and the losses to society
of failing to halt anticompetitive behavior. These losses presumably equal the
benefits to society of an effective remedy for the alleged act. In contrast, the
decision-theoretic approach demands an initial and specific statement of all
payoffs. These can be expressed as net benefits, which include the monetary
costs of proceeding from all decision points, as processed through the payoff
function, or alternatively in terms of the losses associated with failing to cor-
rect anticompetitive behavior, and the losses associated with obtaining a con-
viction when anticompetitive behavior is not occurring.
37That is, notwithstanding the court's verdict, we will not necessarily know with certainty'
whether an anticompetitive act did or did not occur. The best that we can ordinarily do is to
"quote some odds" on the verdict in fact being a "correct" verdict.
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With respect to the probabilities, the traditional approach has several
defects beyond the obvious failure to formally quantify probabilistic
judgments. First, the latter failure results in the inevitable general failure to
appropriately utilize prior knowledgeable judgments 3 and, second, in the
subsequent misuse of any additional information that is generated during the
decision process. Finally, not specifying prior judgments either leads to a
failure to consider the likelihoods of getting the various kinds of sample infor-
mation, or when the latter likelihoods are in fact considered, however vague-
ly, almost certainly results in assessments that are inconsistent with what the
prior judgments would have been, had they been specified.
The lack of a formal decisionmaking structure also contributes to a basic
confusion between the probability of a given "state of nature" conditional
upon the sample information that has been obtained, and the probability of
obtaining that sample information, conditional upon the "state of nature."
This confusion is important, because it can mislead. For example, the pro-
bability that a monopoly firm with complete monopoly power will have a one
hundred percent market share does not, in general, equal the probability that
a monopoly firm with a one hundred percent market share has any monopoly
power, complete or otherwise.3 9 This exemplifies why economic analysis that
extends beyond the presentation of structural indicia is vital to an effective
antitrust enforcement policy.
All of the above implies the authorities' failure to have these probabilities
specified in advance of the very first decision that must be taken. Instead,
particularly at the lower levels in the decisionmaking hierarchy, one risks over
emphasizing the legal issues of the likelihood of developing a "good" case and
the likelihood of getting a verdict of guilty, a nolo plea, or an out of court
settlement. In contrast, the decision-theoretic approach demands that all pro-
babilities be quantified at the outset, that these probabilities be
systematically revised at each stage, and therefore that sample information be
anticipated and not be wasted or misused by giving it an inappropriate
weight.4 0 Finally, with respect to the actual decisions, the traditional ap-
3 For an interesting illustration of the formal use of prior judgments and the Bayesian ap-
proach in economic forecasting, see Stekler, An Analysis of Turning Point Forecasts, 62 Am.
EcON. REV. 724 (1972).
"Iln the strict economic sense, by definition a monopoly with complete market power has a
one hundred percent market share, so that the former probability would be unity. A monopolist
that is the sole seller in a particular geographic area, however, might have virtually no market:ower-that is, the powe  to raise price-because of, e.g., low barriers to entry, potential com-
petitors "waiting in the wings," or low barriers to exit from the geographic area by buyers that
are unwilling to "sit still" for any price increases on the part of the monopoly seller. It is evident
that part of the problem relates to the critical question of market definition, but the basic point
is relevant, nonetheless.
This point is developed in greater detail in another article. See Horowitz, A Bayesian Inter-
pretation of Concentration Data, 1 INDUS. ORGANIZATION REV. 205 (1974). See also Comanor &
Schankerman, Idential Bids and Cartel Behavior, 7 BELL J. EcON. 281 (1976). Comanor and
Schankerman make the same point in formally distinguishing, via Bayes' rule, the probability of
a cartel, given identical bids among firms, and the probability of identical bids, given a cartel.
Id. at 286 n.12.
'
5 Consider the following well-known illustration placed into an antitrust context. Assume
the probability of anticompetitive behavior is assessed, absent of other information, as "one out
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proach generally considers probabilities and payoffs separately, one decision
at a time, whereas the decision-theoretic approach combines these decisions
to generate a prespecified strategy that contains a set of prespecified tactics to
meet each contingency as it occurs. The optimal strategy is readily determin-
ed: it is the sequence that maximizes the statistically expected payoffs.
THE ECONOMIST'S ROLE
The economist has two basic roles to play in a formal antitrust decision-
making procedure. The first is to provide or obtain the numerical
assignments for the various elements that comprise the decision tree; the se-
cond is to outline the optimal strategy. It is important to recognize, however,
that in formal decisionmaking the latter becomes solely a computational
chore to be undertaken by a technician or a computer. No judgments are in-
volved at this stage. Rather, the judgments, both legal and economic, have
already been quantified for use as inputs in generating the optimal decision
strategy.
There are three types of input information that the economist must help
to generate: (1) the risk-preference functions; (2) the terminal payoffs; and
(3) the various probabilities, with the exception that those probabilities
relating strictly to legal matters are to be assessed by the legal staff.
If one accepts the view that antitrust activity should reflect national
policy rather than the personal policy of any single individual or ad-
ministrative agency then the risk-preference function employed in the analysis
should be a societal preference function. 4' Antitrust action is simply one of
the nonquantitative instruments available to national planners for possible use
as a measure in effecting national economic policy. Determination of when
this instrument is or is not activated in a particular instance should be guided
by the same societal preferences that determine such factors as the rates of
government taxing and spending and the extent to which monetary policy is
of twenty," i.e. P(V)= .05. Also, assume that the information is that the eight-firm concentration
ratio is + = .6. Finally, assume that one has determined that the conditional probability of an
eight-firm concentration ratio of at least + = .6. Finally, assume that one has determined that
the conditional probability of an eight-firm concentration ratio of at least + = .6, given that
there is anticompetitive behavior, is P(+ I V) = .9, and that the probability of the concentration
ratio's attaining this level in the absence of anticompetitive behavior is only P(+ IV) = .2. Then,
using Bayes' rule, see note 36 supra, it is immediately determined that the revised probability
of anticompetitive behavior, revised on the basis of the rather high level of industrial concentra-
tion, is still only P(VI + ) = .19. The "no anticompetitive act" outcome is a conclusion that is
almost surely at variance with the conclusion that would be reached by persons who fail to for-
mally recognize their prior beliefs and instead are mesmerized by high concentration ratios. An
awareness of the issue suffices to snap the spell, even though it might not provide a complete
cure.
41If one does not accept this view, then the risk-preference function employed in the
analysis will be different, the benefit and cost terms introduced into the risk-preference function
to generate the payoffs may be different, but the fundamental features of the decision-theoretic
analysis will be unaltered. The present view and my second bias only goes to the question of.
whose risk-preference function to employ.
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employed. The principal means suggested for deriving such a preference
function, as well as the related difficulties and caveats, are well known. 42
Although the notion of economists qua technicians being able to
systematically extract from policymakers the risk-preference functions upon
which those policymakers would prefer to have their decisions based may
seem somewhat farfetched, the point of doing so is not because in reaching
policy decisions we want to take into consideration society's preferences and
attitudes towards risk. In effect, just as there are some decisions that are too
important to be turned over to computers, there are even some decisions that
*are too important to be turned over to lawyersl Assuredly, it is not feasible to
ask citizens to vote on whether, for example, it is worth spending $Y in order
to have a probability of P(Y) of breaking up an alleged price-fixing con-
spiracy among the manufacturers of wood flour toilet seats,4 3 where that con-
spiracy costs society, or at least those citizens that purchase wood flour toilet
seats, an estimated $Z. It is feasible, however, for economists to attempt to
answer the question, in the same manner as we attempt to assess the tradeoffs
that we are willing to accept between, e.g., the unemployment rate and the
rate of inflation when making recommendations on the size of the govern-
ment deficit. These types of decisions suggest the need for political inputs as
a reflection of the preferences of various constituencies. Antitrust policy
should be responsive to precisely the same forces as are the other policy in-
struments. It should be part of a national planning package, rather than be
abandoned, by default, to administrative whim, be it that of lawyers or
economists. As previously suggested, among other things the antitrust deci-
sionmaking process should consider the effects of the alleged behavior, as well
as the effects of any proposed remedy, on such desiderata as the distribution
of income, the rate of inflation, the unemployment rate, the quality of life,
and the balance of payments. Such consideration is clearly within the purview
of the economist. To the extent that one is concerned with the "demonstra-
tion effects" or "deterrent aspects" of antitrust suits, these should show up in
the payoff function. Whether these benefits universally outweigh the potential
costs of a suit to the point where they should be a predominant consideration,
is another matter.
The principal implication of the preceding remarks is that even if the
assessment of the terminal payoffs derived from any sequence of decisions and
outcomes remains as vague in the immediate future as it is today, the range
of factors that enter into the assessment should be greatly expanded.
Specifically, there are benefit and cost considerations that extend well beyond
theoretical concerns as to whether the social costs of monopoly and anticom-
petitive behavior should be evaluated via triangles, or triangles plus rec-
tangles. 44 The wider considerations are not irrelevant to evaluating the costs
42For a discussion, see N. SPULBER & I. HOROWITZ, QUANTITATIVE ECONOMIC POLICY AND
PLANNING 84-106 (1976).
"See United States v. Beatrice Foods Co., CR 4-82165 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
14The "triangles" and "triangles plus rectangles" are geometric configurations whose areas,
as determined by the positioning of industry supply and demand curves, have been suggested as
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to society of anticompetitive behavior. They do, however, greatly expand the
informational demands that are made upon economic science. Specifically,
they force us to establish theoreticaly, and estimate empirically, the impact in
a specific setting of a particular anticompetitive practice, or a lessening of
competition, on any societal desideratum. And there is in all of this the fur-
ther implication that the failure to recognize and allow for these impacts can
result in a serious underestimate of the costs of failing to successfully pro-
secute certain anticompetitive acts, particularly those acts involving the major
firms in major industries. For example, there is a substantive economic
justification for the antitrust authorities' showing greater concern over, e.g.,
vertical integration among oil refiners than over alleged price fixing among
toilet-seat manufacturers. The economic concerns might very well outweigh
the likelihood of obtaining a conviction under some antitrust statute when a
decision is being made as to whether to file suit; they may also outweigh the
likelihood of uncovering sufficient evidence during a preliminary investigation
to subsequently warrant filing suit when a decision is being made as to
whether to conduct such an investigation. 4 5
There are, in general, two different sets of probabilities that are the
economist's responsibility to assess: (1) the prior probabilities that a particular
act is or is not anticompetitive and (2) the conditional probabilities that
evidence, favorable, neutral, or unfavorable to the hypothesis that anticom-
petitive behavior obtains, will be generated during an investigation, given
that anticompetitive behavior actually does or does not obtain. The remain-
ing probabilities follow immediately from the latter probability assignments,
given the sample evidence. The single exception to this is the set of pro-
babilities associated with the trial decision, i.e. the probabilities of obtaining
verdicts of guilty or not guilty, given the nature of the sample evidence. The
latter probabilities, it would seem, are most knowledgeably assessed by the
legal staff.
It is in these stages of the analysis that the economist should be making
use of the various economic indicia that frequently are considered to be
"evidence" when a case is actually being tried. In particular, prior to an in-
vestigation the various structural data and institutional knowledge that might
be readily available, such as the level of seller's and buyer's concentration, the
number of firms in the industry and the size of geographic markets, and the
extent of vertical integration, should be used to permit the economist to assess
the prior probability that a given situation will support some allegation of
anticompetitive behavior. 46 The evidence generated at the investigation stage,
appropriate measures of social distortions or welfare losses due to monopoly. See Harberger,
Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. EcON. Rxv. 77 (Supp. 1954) (triangles); Posner, The
Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975) (triangles plus rec-
tangles); Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tarrffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. EcON. J. 224
(1967) (triangles plus rectangles).
45Which is not to suggest that these same considerations might not provide ample justifica-
tion for prosecuting the latter case rather than the former.
"6For some probes in this direction, see Hay & Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing
Conspiracies, 17 J.L. & EcON. 13 (1974).
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evidence relating to conduct and performance, is then used to revise these in-
itial judgments, after we have previously established the conditional pro-
babilities that, for example, the existence of trade associations, reciprocity,
buy-sell arrangements, and comparative-number price catalogues lead to, or
are symptomatic of, anticompetitive behavior or market structures that are
incompatible with that of a competitive economy.
Thus, for example, data revealing a high degree of seller's concentration
only indicate that there is a higher probability, a priori, of an anticompetitive
finding than in the case where the data reveal a low degree of seller's concen-
tration. Similarly, data revealing that there are only a few sellers in a market
only indicate that there is a higher a priori probability of collusion among
them, and a greater probability therefore that a merger between any two will
effect a lessening of competition, than when there are many sellers. Neither
the concentration ratio nor the number of sellers are determinative of
anything with respect to the actual degree of competition.
In the case of per se Violations, such as price fixing, the mathematics
works itself out such that given the discovery of price fixing, the probability
of an anticompetitive act is automatically revised to unity, irrespective of
one's prior beliefs. In other instances, evidence of an especially high rate of
return, various intra-industry contractual arrangements, tying agreements,
and the like will simply be used to revise the prior probability that there is
anticompetitive behavior.
In each of the latter instances, the economist's role should not be reduced
solely to performing the clerical tasks, or conducting the investigation that
produces the data upon which these probability assessments will be based.
Rather, the economist's efforts should be directed toward establishing what
these data really imply with respect to the probability assessments. 47 This is
not to say that we will soon see the day where a court reaches a judgment in
an antitrust case based strictly upon an economic expert's probability
statements. It remains the lawyers' responsibility to obtain a courtroom con-
viction, presumably based, at least in part, on the economic evidence
developed under the economist's guidance, irrespective of whether the lawyers
and the court give this evidence the appropriate weight and economic inter-
pretation, as opposed to legal interpretation. This does suggest, however, that
as an instrument of economic policy, decisions regarding the implementation
of the antitrust laws, and the attempted use of an antitrust statute as a
measure in a given situation, should be guided by economic science and the
economist's knowledgeable judgments.
47This is not meant to imply that economists should absent themselves from the dirty-hands
tasks associated with antitrust. Frequently, one learns a good deal, in the course of getting one's
hands dirty, besides which the economist, as opposed to an assistant, might be essential to the ac-
tual information-grubbing process. As part of the evaluation process, and irrespective of the at-
titudes of the court, the economist's judgments should reflect all information, including post-
acquisition information. Information is a valuable commodity. It should not be wasted.
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CONCLUSION
Antitrust problems involve legal issues, insofar as we deal with them
through existing statutes, and they involve economic issues, insofar as they
relate to economic questions that are matters of national economic policy. As
such, the attorney's contribution to the antitrust process should become para-
mount in the courtroom, and the economist's contribution should become
paramount in deciding whether an antitrust problem gets to the courtroom in
the first place. In this context, the economist's job is the analysis of economic
information and legal inputs for the purposes of providing attorneys with the
economic data which courts need in deciding antitrust cases and providing
antitrust administrators with the optimal strategy, and its decision-theoretic
rationale, for antitrust enforcement. The attorney's job is incorporating the
economist's data into the appropriate legal framework for courtroom presen-
tation. My impression is that we are heading in that direction.

